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Introduction
CONVENTIONAL COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS are among our
nation's largest and dirtiest sources of energy. Not only are they a
leading cause of respiratory illness, they account for more than forty
percent of United States carbon dioxide emissions.' Over the course
of its fifty-year life span, a single 850 megawatt conventional coal-fired
plant will spew 400 million tons of carbon dioxide, four tons of mercury, and 189,000 tons of sulfur dioxide into the environment-into
the air we breathe, the water we drink, the food we eat, and the atmosphere that sustains life on earth. 2 Yet the world relies on coal-fired
power to provide the energy it needs to run its ever growing econo* Patricia Weisselberg is a May 2007 graduate of the University of San Francisco
School of Law where she earned a certificate in Public Interest Law. She has clerked for
the United States Environmental Protection Agency, the Sierra Club, Baykeeper, and the
San Francisco City Attorney's Energy and Telecommunications Team.
1. Sierra Club, The Truth Behind Coal, http://www.sierraclub.org/coal/overview
(last visited July 7, 2007).
2. PUB. CITIZEN'S TEX. OFFICE & THE SUSTAINABLE ENERGY & ECON. DEV. COAL., PREMATURE MORTALITY FROM PROPOSED NEW COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS IN TEXAS 7 (2006),

available at http://www.cleartheair.org/documents/TxDDAPreportFINAL.pdf.
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mies. Forty percent of the world's electricity is generated by coal-fired
power plants. 3We are currently faced with a monumental struggle as we attempt
to wrest ourselves from our reliance on conventional coal-fired power
and other fossil fuels and fully embrace the potential of energy efficiency, renewable energy, and new energy technology. There is nothing less at stake than the future of the planet. Overwhelming scientific
evidence supports the reality that climate change is happening right
now and that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases ("GHGs")
are the likely cause. We will not find a solution to global warming until
we can control emissions from two major sources-motor vehicles and
4
coal-fired power plants.
California, the twelfth-largest producer of carbon dioxide in the
world, 5 took affirmative steps to reduce its GHG emissions and in so
doing, provided leadership for the rest of the nation. The focus of this
paper is on California's attempt to curb its use of conventional coalfired power through an innovative new law known as the Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Performance Standard Act ("SB 1368" or "Act"), which
forbids California utilities from making long-term financial investments or procurement contracts with power plants whose GHG emis6
sions exceed the performance standard.
Opponents, however, claim that the new law violates the dormant
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. They are wrong.
As will be demonstrated, SB 1368 passes dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny and is an appropriate state response to the dangers posed by
global warming. Part I of this Comment provides both the federal and
state political and economic context for the law. It discusses how the
federal government's coal-friendly energy policy and its decision not
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol or enact climate change legislation reDEP'T OF ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2007:
(2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/electricity.html.
4. See R.T. Pierrehumbert, Climate Change: A Catastrophein Slow Motion, 6 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 573, 587-88 (2006) ("Coal is a particularly pernicious fuel because, even burned efficiently, it puts fully a third more carbon dioxide into the air than natural gas for a given
amount of energy released. In practice, the figure is even worse than this since the cheapest ways of burning coal waste a large amount of the energy, meaning that yet more coal
has to be burned to produce the desired quantity of electricity. Coal is cheap, so there is
little incentive to invest capital in its efficient use unless the environmental costs of burning
it are somehow internalized.").
5. See Union of Concerned Scientists, California Global Warming Impacts and Solutions (Feb. 2006), http://www.ucsusa.org/cleancalfornia/ca-global-warming-impacts.
html.
6. S.B. 1368, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).

3.
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sulted in an explosion in the number of new coal-fired power plants in
the last five years. It also describes California's primary efforts to address global warming through litigation and legislation. Part II details
the provisions of SB 1368, traces its beginnings in the California Public Utilities Commission, and examines the likely impacts of the law.
Part III analyzes dormant Commerce Clause challenges to SB 1368 in
light of its potentially serious repercussions for businesses located
outside the state. Part IV concludes that SB 1368 is constitutional and
may provide guidance to other states that are crafting their own global
warming solutions.
I.

Background

A.

Federal Economic and Political Context

In 1992, the first President Bush signed the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC"), which the
United States Senate quickly ratified. 7 UNFCCC called for voluntary
measures aimed at stabilizing "greenhouse gas concentrations (not
emissions) in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
8
human interference with the climate system."
In 1997, signatories to UNFCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol
("Protocol") which requires participating countries to lower their
emissions of GHGs collectively by at least five percent from 1990
levels. 9 President Bill Clinton supported the Protocol, and it was
signed by Vice President Al Gore in 1998. 1°Nevertheless, the Protocol
was never submitted to the Senate for ratification in light of a Senate
resolution strongly opposing the Protocol and expressing concern it
"could result in serious harm to the United States economy."1 1
In a surprising move, Presidential candidate George W. Bush
pledged that if elected he would support setting limits on carbon dioxide emissions from power plants. 12 Two months after his inaugura7.

Naomi Oreskes, The Long Consensus on Climate Change, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2007, at

A15.
8. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
9. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/
conveng.pdf.
10. Fred Hiatt, Obstinate Orthodoxy, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2003, at A13.
11. Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997), available at http://www.
nationalcenter.org/KyotoSenate.html.
12. See Douglas Jehl & Andrew C. Revkin, Bush, in Reversal, Won't Seek Cut in Emissions
of Carbon Dioxide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at Al, available at http://select.nytimes.com/
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tion, however, President Bush backed away from that promise, saying
3
it was inconsistent with the goal of increasing energy production.'
In June of 2001, he formally announced his administration's opposition to the Protocol and adopted the position of his National En4
ergy Task Force headed by Vice President Dick Cheney.' President
Bush explained he had changed his position because United States
15
compliance with carbon dioxide limits would be too expensive.
The cost concerns of limiting carbon dioxide emissions and scientific uncertainty concerning global warming influenced the federal
16
government's decision not to regulate GHGs on a national level. In
his first speech about global climate change, President Bush stated:
We do not know how much our climate could, or will change in
the future. We do not know how fast change will occur, or even
And, finally, no one
how some of our actions could impact it....
level of
can say with any certainty what constitutes a dangerous
7
warming, and therefore what level must be avoided.1
Although the United States never ratified the Protocol, a sufficient number of other countries did, and it went into effect on February 16, 2005.18

B.

California Economic and Political Context

While the Bush administration downplayed the science linking
GHG emissions and climate change, California officials were heeding
warnings that global warming could degrade air quality, cause severe
flooding in California's coastal communities, cause deadly heat waves
gst/abstract.html?res=F30917FE345EOC778DDDAA0894D9404482&n=top%2fReference%
2fTimes%2OTopics%2fOrganizations%2fE%2fEnergy%20Department%20.
13. Id.
14. The National Energy Task Force was a source of national controversy when government watchdog groups claimed that oil and coal company executives had too much
influence in crafting the nation's energy policy. See generally Michael Abramowitz & Steven
Mufson, PapersDetail Industry's Role in Cheney's Energy Report, WASH. PosT, July 18, 2007, at
20 07 0 7
/ / 17/
Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
way to the
all
the
battled
Cheney
President
Vice
AR2007071701987.html?hpid=topnews.
Supreme Court to keep secret the details of the meetings and who attended. Id.; see also
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
15. Press Release, White House, President George W. Bush Discusses Global Climate
6
Change (June 11, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200/06/200l0 112.html.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Shankar Vedantam, Kyoto Treaty Takes Effect Today, WASH. PosT, Feb. 16, 2005, at
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in the Central Valley, and significantly decrease snowfall in the Sierra
Nevada mountains. 19
Scientists warned that water supplies would be at risk because rising sea levels would result in saltwater intrusion into California estuaries. 20 As the snow pack shrank it would decrease snowmelt and spring
stream flows, contributing to shortages in drinking water and water
used to irrigate crops. 2 1 Decreased snow melt would also result in decreased hydroelectricpower, which supplies about fifteen percent of
22
in-state electricity production.
California has long recognized and accepted its role as a leader in
environmental regulation. 23 The state has made great strides in reducing pollution from the energy sector within its borders. Tough air pollution laws kept virtually all conventional coal-fired power plants out
of California. 24 The state promoted energy efficiency, adopting the
nation's "most aggressive goals for electricity and natural gas efficiency program savings for the state's three major investor-owned utilities." 2 5 In addition, the California Public Utilities Commission
adopted a renewable portfolio standard requiring utilities to procure
twenty percent of their power from clean, renewable sources by
2017.26

Faced with the federal government's unwillingness to ratify the
Protocol or pass climate change legislation with mandatory controls
on GHG emissions, California chose to deal with the problem. It
looked at the two sources that generate a large part of the world's
19.
FORNIA

CAL. CLIMATE CHANGE CTR., OUR CHANGING CLIMATE: ASSESSING THE RISKS TO CAI-

5-8 (2006), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2006publications/CEC-500-2006-077/CEC500-2006-077.PDF.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id. at 6-7.
22. Id. at 7.
23. It was the first state in the nation to adopt vehicle emission standards for criteria
pollutants, before passage of the Federal Clean Air Act. See ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVINROMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 554 (4th ed. 2003). California's stringent emission standards have served as models for federal standards and several other
ras Authority toReulate Mostates have adopted them. See Rachel L. Chanin, Note, Califor
bile Source Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 699, 713-20 (2003).
24. CTR. FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE TECHS. ET AL., CLEARING CALIFORNIA'S
COAL SHADOW FROM THE AMERICAN WEST 3 (2005), available at http://www.westernresource
advocates.org/media/pdf/CA%20Coal%20Shadow.pdf.
25. Id. at 33.
26. Id. at 9. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and the California Energy Commission
have endorsed an acceleration of the deadline to 2010 with an expanded goal of thirtythree percent renewable energy by 2020. See S.B. 107, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006),
avalable at http://www.energy.ca.gov/portfolio/documents/SB_107_BILL_20060926_
CHAPTERED.PDF.
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GHG emissions-motor vehicles and conventional coal-fired power
plants 7-and began to take action.
Controlling GHG emissions from vehicles was the first step. In
2002, the California legislature passed an innovative law, AB 1493, requiring the California Air Resources Board ("CARB") to adopt a rule
regulating GHG emissions from cars, the first rule of its kind in the
nation. 28 In 2004, CARB adopted regulations implementing AB 1493
requiring SUVs and trucks to reduce GHG emissions by nearly thirty
percent. 29 Six weeks later a group of nine automobile manufacturers
filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the regulations. 30 As of
publication, the case is still pending in federal court.
Passing a law requiring GHG emissions reductions in the energy
sector took longer. State officials, grappling with the power crisis and
rolling blackouts of 2000-2001, focused their attention on "reliability"
to ensure that there would be a reliable and adequate supply of electricity humming across state transmission lines. 31 In order to provide
that adequate supply, officials faced "an inconvenient truth." The
truth indicated that a sizeable percentage of California's electricity
originated from dirty, out-of-state, coal-burning power plants, and that
percentage was growing. In the decade between 1995 and 2004, California's importation of coal-fueled power grew from 16.5% of overall
electricity to 21.3%.32 However, during the same period, the state's

27. Lainie Motamedi, California Public Utilities Commission, Climate Change and
the California Public Utilities Commission's Role, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/static/energy/
electric/climate+change/climatechangediscussionpaper.doc (last visited Aug. 31, 2007).
28. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a) (West 2006); see Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role for Federal, State, and Litzgatzon Initiatives?,
42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39 (2007). California took action after the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") claimed it did not have authority under the Clean Air Act to establish
standards for motor vehicle GHG emissions. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1450
(2007). As a result of a lawsuit brought by California, eleven other states, and various environmental groups, the United States Supreme Court ruled that EPA had the authority and
was required to regulate motor vehicle GHG emissions unless EPA determined emissions
were not a danger to public health and welfare. Id. at 1463.
29. News Release, Air Res. Bd., Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, ARB Approves Greenhouse
Gas Rule (Sept. 24, 2004), http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/nr092404.htm.
30. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Cal.
2006).
31. Allan Chen, The California Energy Crisis: A Brief Summary of Events, EN'VTL. ENERGY
TECHS. Div. NEWS, Summer 2001, at 1, available at http://eetdnews.lbl.gov/nl8/eetd8.pdf.
32. Mark Martin, Imported Electricity Fails State Standards, Coal-FiredPlants Harm Environment in West, Report Says, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 2, 2005, at Al, availableat http://sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/C/a/2005/12/02/MNGSNG1SQFI .DTL.
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use of renewable energy remained stagnant, hovering between 9.2%
and 11.5%. 3"
To feed California's growing hunger for energy, California utilities made large investments in conventional coal-fired power plants in
the four corner states of Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah.3 4
While tough laws had kept particulate pollution and mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants out of California, the laws did nothing to control the growing GHG emissions associated with California's
electricity use.
California officials faced a challenge. Anticipating a growth in
electricity consumption of 1.5% annually between 2004 and 2016,
they predicted California utilities would need to procure 24,000 megawatts of peak resources to replace expiring contracts, retiring power
plants, and meet peak demand growth by 2016. 35 The question was
how to procure that new capacity and still achieve reductions in GHG
emissions. Would energy efficiency programs and purchases of electricity from renewable energy sources, natural gas, and hydroelectric
power plants be adequate to meet demand and be cost-effective? Or, if
coal-fired power plants continued to supply California with a large
part of its electricity, was there a way to make them utilize new technology that would reduce their greenhouse gas emissions?
Electricity generators were gambling that California and other
states would look at the options and decide that electricity purchased
from conventional coal-fired power plants was still the cheapest and
most reliable source. Proposals for construction of new coal-fired
power plants exploded as energy companies decided to take advantage of the Bush administration's coal-friendly energy policy.3 6 Electric utility companies proposed building 129 large coal-fired power
33.

34.

Id.

See CTR. FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE TECHS. ET AL., supra note 24.
35. Electricity demand is measured in two ways: consumption and peak demand. Electricity consumption is the amount of electricity, measured in gigawatt hours (G'rh), that
consumers in the state actually use. CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, 2005 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY
REPORT 46 (2005), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-100-2005007/CEC-100-2005-007-CMF.PDF. In contrast, peak demand, measured in megawatts, is
the amount of generation needed to keep electrons flowing in the system at any given
moment of peak demand. Id. at 46-47. Meeting peak demand is primarily an operational
issue for system operators-how much will be needed to keep the lights on under worst
case conditions and where will those resources come from? Id. at 52.
36. Under the Bush administration, EPA scuttled a plan made by the Clinton EPA to
regulate mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants using the Clean Air Act's most
stringent technology based standard, replacing it with a less stringent "cap and trade" system that would create mercury hot spots. See David B. Spence, Coal-FiredPower in a Restructured Electricity Market, 15 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 187, 204-11, 218 (2005). Also, the
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plants throughout the country,3 7 thirty-one of them in the Interior
West states of Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, and Nevada.38 These proposed plants wait, poised to
feed the energy demands of booming metropolitan areas, not only in
California, but also Phoenix, Las Vegas, Denver, and Salt Lake City.3 9

Deregulation of energy markets also fueled the rush to build coalfired power plants and gave rise to a new category of electricity generators, so-called "merchant" power plants. 40 Unlike traditional power
plants built to provide electricity to local retail customers and regulated by public utility commissions, merchant power plants are built to
sell electricity on the wholesale market, often to out-of-state utilities
who then distribute the electricity to their retail customers. 4' These
merchant power plants are under the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and out of the regulatory reach of state
public utility commissions.

42

Coal companies have chosen states such as Wyoming, Nevada,
and Utah as the site of new merchant power plants. 4 3 However, coal

companies recognized that transmission lines needed to be constructed to bring power from merchant plants to California-a major
undertaking. 44 California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, elected
after the state's power crisis fueled the recall of Governor Gray Davis,
45
threw his weight behind the idea of new transmission lines.
Bush administration abandoned steps EPA had already taken to regulate carbon dioxide
emissions from coal-fired power plants. Id.
37. NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, FUELING THE FIRE: GLOBAL WARMING, FOSSIL FUELS AND THE
FISH AND WILDLIFE OF THE AMERICAN WEST 15 (2006),

available at http://www.nwf.org/

globalwarming/pdfs/FuelingTheFire.pdf.
38. Platts.com, Proposed Coal Plants in the Interior West, http://www.platts.com/
Electric%20Power/Resources/News%20Features/capower/frontier map.xm (last visited
Aug. 31, 2007) [hereinafter Proposed Coal Plans in the Interior West].
39. John Ritter, California Planning Green Power Revolution, USA TODAY, July 5, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-07-05-cal-energy-x.htrn.
40. Jeffery S. Dennis, Federalism, ElectricIndustry Restructuring,and the Dormant Commerce
Clause: Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia and State Restrictions on the Development of MerchantPower
Plants,43 NAT. RES. J. 615, 616-17 (2003).

41.
42.

Id.
See generally ENERGY

INFO. ADMIN.,

DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF

THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 2000: AN UPDATE: IMPACTS OF ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY

RESTRUCTURING ON THE COAL INDUSTRY, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg-

stru-update/chapterl.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2007).
43.

Penni Crabtree, 4-State TransmissionPlan to be Powered Up, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB.,

Apr. 4, 2005,
html.
44. Id.
45. Id.

http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20050404/newsln4power.
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In April 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger signed an agreement
with the governors of Wyoming, Utah, and Nevada to pursue a 1,300
mile long transmission line, dubbed the Frontier Line, that would
connect the four states. 46 The agreement signaled each State's commitment to the effort and established a task force to explore regulatory hurdles and financial options. 4 7 Even before the agreement was
signed, the states began to identify the route of the project, which for
the most part would rely on proposed or existing transmission
48
corridors.
Projected to cost $3.3 billion, the line was designed to bring as
much as 12,000 megawatts of power to the West Coast.4 9 Frontier Line
proponents claimed it would carry electricity from a mix of sources,
including "clean coal," wind, and solar, and predicted that it would be
the largest enabler of renewable energy technologies ever proposed in
50
the United States.
Project skeptics, however, saw conventional coal plants as the
likely winners. 5 1 In Wyoming, proposals had already been submitted
for nearly 4,000 megawatts of coal-fired generation to be built near
52
the open-pit, low-sulfur coal mines in the state's Powder River Basin.
In all, fourteen new coal-fired power plants were proposed in the
Frontier Line states 53 and none of them utilized "clean coal" integrated gasification combined cycle ("IGCC") technology. 54 In fact,
46. Martin, supra note 32, at Al.
47. Platts.com, Western Governors Pursue Four-State Frontier Line, http://platts.
com/Electric%20Power/Resources/News%2OFeatures/capower/frontier.xml
(last visited
Aug. 31, 2007) [hereinafter Western Governors Pursue Four-State Frontier Line].
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Ritter, supra note 39.
51. Id.
52. Platts.com, California's Resource Planners Think Long-term, http://www.platts.
com/Electric%20Power/Resources/News%20Features/capower/index.xml
(last visited
Sept. 25, 2007).
53. Proposed Coal Plants in the Interior West, supra note 38.
54. For a description of IGCC technology, see Clean Coal, STATE ENV'T EXCH. (Progressive Pol'y Inst., D.C.), Dec. 2, 2004, http://www.ppionline.org/ppi-ci.cfm?knlgArealD=116
&subseclD=900039&conten tD=253047 ("IGCC [Integrated gasification combined cycle]
plants turn coal into a synthetic gas composed mainly of hydrogen ... and carbon monoxide ....
The gas is processed to remove 95 percent or more of its sulfur and nitrogen
impurities, making it nearly as clean-burning as natural gas. The cleaned-up gas is burned
in a turbine to create one source of electricity. Then the heated exhaust is captured to boil
water, creating steam to drive a second electricity-generating turbine. This latter exhaust
contains carbon dioxide in a highly concentrated form, which makes it easier to capture
and keep out of the environment, for example by pumping it into the ground.").
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none of the thirty-one proposed coal-fired power plants in the Interior

55
West proposed using "clean coal" technology.
The tension between the need to provide the State with a reliable
source of electricity and the State's goal of reducing its GHG emissions provided the backdrop for what ultimately became Senate Bill
1368.

Senate Bill 1368: California's Authority to Regulate its
Own Utilities Provides the Cornerstone for an
Innovative Approach

II.

A.

Laying the Groundwork

SB 1368 had its genesis in actions taken by the California Public
Utilities Commission ("CPUC" or "Commission") and the California
Energy Commission ("CEC") between 2003 and 2006.56 CPUC regulates the three major investor-owned electric utilities, Pacific Gas and
Electric Company ("PG&E"), Southern California Edison Company
("SCE"), and San Diego Gas and Electric Company ("SDG&E"), as
well as some smaller electric service providers, which together provide
about seventy-eight percent of the state's power. 57 CPUC also regulates some smaller electric-service providers, publicly-owned utilities,
and community-choice aggregates. 58 Collectively the utilities and elec59
tric-service providers are known as load serving entities ("LSEs") .
CPUC and CEC first addressed GHG emissions reductions in
their 2003 Energy Action Plan ("EAP") .60 No specific reduction target
was identified, only a nonspecific goal to minimize "the energy sector's impact on climate change." 6 1 The focus in the original EAP was
on decreasing per capita energy use and reducing toxic emissions and
55. Ritter, supra note 39.
56. CPUC, Phase 1 Scoping Memo and Notice of Workshop on Interim Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Performance Standard at 2-8, Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement
the Commission's Procurement Incentive Framework and to Examine the Integration of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into Procurement Policies, Rulemaking 06-04-009
(June 1, 2006), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/EFILE/RULC/56888.pdf.
57. CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, 2007 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT 13-14 (2007),
available at http://vvw.energy.ca.gov/2007publications/CEC-100-2007-008/CEC-100-

2007-008-CTD.PDF.
58.

2007).
59.

Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n ("CPUC"), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov (last visited Aug. 31,

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8340(h) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
60. State of Cal., Energy Action Plan (May 8, 2003), available at http://www.energy.ca.
gov/energy-action-plan/2003-05-08_ACTIONPLAN.PDF.
61. Id. at 3.
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gases through increased conservation, efficiency, and renewable
resources.62

The process of writing regulations to achieve GHG emission reductions began on April 1, 2004 when CPUC issued an Order Instituting Rulemaking calling for the establishment of a cap and trade
procurement incentive framework. 63 CPUC envisioned a multi-step
process. First, it would quickly establish some sort of interim cap or
standard that would keep utilities from locking themselves into long
term contracts or investments in power plants with high GHG emissions. 6 4 Once there were some initial limits on GHG emissions in
place, the Commission would have breathing room to work out the
65
details of an overall cap and trade system for the electricity sector.
As part of this initial cap component, the Commission began to
explore ways to limit the carbon-based energy that utilities were allowed to produce or buy. In March 2005, CPUC convened a three-day
workshop to discuss ways to achieve GHG emission reductions
through the procurement process. 66 Representatives from the utilities,
energy producers, ratepayers' associations, and environmental groups
67
submitted comments.
Some parties raised the issue of CPUC's legal authority to impose
a GHG emissions cap on the load-serving entities. 68 Parties also
presented their viewpoints on which kind of cap should be implemented. 69 Two major options discussed were a load-based cap and a
generation-based cap. 7 0 Under a load-based cap, the LSEs would be
subject to a GHG emissions cap for all resources they purchased to
7
serve their load, no matter from which source, including imports.
62. CPUC, Opinion on Procurement Incentives Framework at 7, Decision 06-02-032,
Order Instituting Rulemaking to Promote Policy and Program Coordination and Integraion in Electric Utility Resource Planning, Rulemaking 04-04-003 (Feb. 16, 2006) [hereinafter Opinion on Procurement Incentives Framework], available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
WORDPDF/FINALDECISION/53720.PDF.
63. CPUC, Order Instituting Rulemaking to Promote Policy and Program Coordination and Integration in Electric Utility Resource Planning, Rulemaking 04-04-003 (Apr. 1,
2004).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Opinion on Procurement Incentives Framework, supra note 62, at 9.
67. See id. at 5.
68. Id. at 17.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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Under a generation-based cap, each electricity generator would be
72
subject to a GHG emissions cap.
SCE and SDG&E supported the generation-based cap. 73 Environ-

mental groups, however, supported the load-based cap as the best way
to minimize "leakage. ' 74 Leakage occurs when utilities, faced with a
cap on emissions from electricity providers within the state, import
electricity from out-of-state power plants which traditionally have been
beyond the reach of a state cap. 7 5 Environmental groups also raised

concerns about "contract shuffling" where suppliers with large portfolios of resources with differing levels of GHG emissions allocate their
contracts to California in such a way as to show a reduction in GHG
76
emissions without actually lowering their overall GHG emissions.
On June 1, 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger created a new impetus for an emissions cap when he announced statewide GHG emission
reduction targets in Executive Order S-3-05. 7 7 The targets were: (1)
reduction to 2000 emissions levels by 2010; (2) reduction to 1990
levels by 2020; and (3) reduction to eighty percent below 1990 levels
by 2050.78 The Order also established a multi-agency effort, known as
the Climate Action Team, to develop strategies to achieve the
targets. 79 Among the strategies identified was a significant reduction
in GHG emissions from the electricity sector.8 0
In September and October 2005, CPUC and CEC updated the
EAP with EAP II, incorporating several key actions specific to reducing GHG emissions, such as "ensuring that energy supplies serving
California, from any source, are consistent with the Governor's climate change goals."8
The updated plan was a response not only to the Governor's Executive Order but also to the Frontier Line agreement for a proposed
new 1300 mile transmission line linking Wyoming and California.8 2
Both CPUC and CEC were well aware that the proposed transmission
line would likely spur the construction of conventional coal-fired
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Cal. Exec. Order No. S-3-05 (2005), available at http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/
energy/ExecOrderS-3-05.htm.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Opinion on Procurement Incentives Framework, supra note 62, at 19.
81. Id. at 11-12.
82. Western Governors Pursue Four-State Frontier Line, supra note 47.
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power plants in other states to meet California's demand, unless Cali-

8
fornia imposed controls.

3

On October 6, 2005, CPUC issued a Policy Statement on Greenhouse Gas Performance Standards in which it stated:
The State's energy agencies must act expeditiously and in concert
to send the right investment signals to electricity markets through-

out the West .... there are approximately 30 proposed coal fired
plants across the West, some of which are planned in anticipation
of meeting demand in California. The carbon dioxide emissions
from just three 500 MW conventional coal-fired power plants
would offset all of the emissions reductions from the IOUs' [Investor Owned Utilities] energy efficiency programs and would seriously compromise the State's ability to meet the Governor's GHG
goals. As the largest electricity consumer in the region, California
has an obligation to provide clear guidance on performance standards for utility procurement . ... 4
That guidance began to take shape in a policy decision issued
February 16, 2006, in which CPUC laid out the framework for its cap
and trade program.8 5 The Commission decided, despite the objec86
tions of SCE and SDG&E, to establish a load-based cap.
There were two main reasons for choosing the load-based cap.
First, it would minimize the potential for leakage across California's
borders because LSEs would not be able to get around the cap by
purchasing electricity from out-of-state generators who exceeded the
emissions performance standard.8 7 Second, by choosing a load-based
cap, CPUC confined its regulatory reach to the California utilities over
which it had jurisdiction.8 8 The Commission reasoned that while it
probably could not impose a generation-cap on out-of-state
"merchant" power plants under the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy
Commission, regulation of the GHG emissions associated with LSEs'
electricity purchases was well within CPUC authority over the procurement activities of LSEs, pursuant to Public Utility Code § 701. 8 9
CPUC noted the permissive nature of section 701.90 "' [T] he commission's powers are not limited to those expressly conferred on it:
83. CPUC, Comm'n, Policy Statement on Greenhouse Gas Performance Standards
(Oct. 6, 2005), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/word-pdf/REPORT/50432.pdf.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Opinion on Procurement Incentives Framework, supra note 62, at 22-23.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
89. Id.; see also CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (West 1997).
90. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 ("The commission may supervise and regulate every
public utility in the State and may do all things, whether specifically designated in this part
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the Legislature further authorized the commission to "do all things,
whether specifically designated in [the Public Utilities Act] or in addition thereto, which are necessary and convenient" in the exercise of its
jurisdiction over public utilities.'"91
CPUC also noted that no party had cited any statute directly barring CPUC from issuing these regulations and had not provided any
justification for the argument that pollution and emissions from utility
generation or purchased power are not "'cognate or germane to the
regulation of public utilities,'" the primary limiting factor on Commis92
sion jurisdiction.
CPUC expressed hope that the implications of its policy decision
would be far-reaching.
[W]e are joining in the pioneering efforts on greenhouse gas regulation started in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states with the voluntary Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative there. We hope that
these parallel but distinct efforts on both coasts will help move the
ball forward on initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
mitigate global
climate change in the United States and around
93
the world.
B.

Legislative Action

Building on the momentum created by the actions of CPUC and
CEC, California Senate President Don Perata introduced the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Performance Standard Act in the California Senate on February 21, 2006. 9 4 A GHG "emissions performance standard"
("EPS") is the amount of GHGs a power plant can emit without exceeding the cap set by agencies that regulate utilities' electricity
95
purchases.
The bill prohibits investor-owned utilities and other electric-service providers regulated by CPUC, as well as local, publicly-owned
electric utilities under CEC's jurisdiction, from entering into longor in addition thereto, which are necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power
and jurisdiction.").
91. Opinion on Procurement Incentives Framework, supra note 62, at 20-21 (citing
SDG&E v. Super. Ct., 920 P.2d 669, 681 (Cal. 1996) (citing section 701)).
92. Id. at 21 (citing PG&E Corp. v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 630, 650
(Ct. App. 2001)).
93. Id. at 5. The seven states in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative have signed a
Memorandum of Understanding to set a cap on GHG emissions from fossil-fuel-fired electric generators in their states and begin a regional cap and trade program on January 1,
2009. See Reg'l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Multi-State RGGI Agreement, http://www.rggi.
org/agreement.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2007).
94. S.B. 1368, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
95. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
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term financial commitments to purchase electricity from, or invest in,
power plants that do not comply with a GHG EPS.90 A long-term financial commitment is defined as "either a new ownership investment
in baseload generation or a new or renewed contract with a term of
five or more years, which includes procurement of baseload
97
generation."
The bill required CPUC, by February 1, 2007, and CEC, by June
30, 2007, to set a GHG EPS that would not exceed the rate of GHG
emissions of a combined-cycle natural-gas-fired power plant.98 CPUC
and CEC were also required to adopt enforcement rules and procedures for utilities to verify the emissions of GHGs from any power
plant supplying their electricity under a contract subject to the GHG
EPS. 9 9
The Legislative Counsel's Digest explained the bill's two primary
purposes. First, the legislature sought to reduce California's contribution to global warming by encouraging new long-term financial commitments to zero- or low-carbon generating resources. 10 0 The
legislature declared that "[i]n order to have any meaningful impact
on climate change, the Governor's goals for reducing emissions of
greenhouse gases must be applied to the state's electricity consumption, not just the state's electricity production."' 10 1
Second, the legislature sought to protect California consumers
from financial risks and reliability problems which could result from
federal regulation of GHG emissions:
[F] ederal regulation of emissions of greenhouse gases is likely during this decisionmaking timeframe. It is vital to ensure all electricity load-serving entities internalize the significant and
underrecognized cost of emissions recognized by the PUC with respect to the investor-owned electric utilities, and to reduce Califorassociated with future federal regulation of
nia's exposure to10 costs
2
these emissions.
While SB 1368 was making its way through the legislature, CPUC
moved ahead with the next phase of its rulemaking process, which
involved thrashing out the specific details of the EPS. On June 1,
2006, the Commission issued a Scoping Memo and Notice of Work96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. § 8341 (a) (b).
Id. § 8340(j).
Id.§ 8341 (d) (1), (e)(1).
Id.§ 8341 (b) (3).
S.B. 1368 § I(d)-(e), 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
S.B. 1368 § (1)(k), 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
Id. § l(f)-(g).
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10 3
shop on Interim Greenhouse Gas Emissions Performance Standard.
The Commission directed the parties to submit briefs discussing jurisdictional and other legal issues pertinent to the interim performance
standard.' 0 4 Utilities and coal companies continued to argue that
CPUC did not have sufficient authority under the Public Utility Code
to regulate GHG emissions. In its Opening Brief to CPUC, the Center
for Energy and Economic Development' 0 5 ("CEED") stated,
The Commission appears to be considering the over-all impact of
pollution on society at large in the course of carrying out its regulatory function by creating the load-based GHG emissions cap and
interim EPS. The authority to promulgate such sweeping environmental reforms
lies with the California legislature, not with the
1 06
Commission.
The arguments concerning CPUC's authority were put to rest
when the legislature passed SB 1368, giving CPUC and CEC specific
authority to set a GHG EPS and setting February 1, 2007 as the date
the new standard was to take effect. 10 7 On September 29, 2006, Governor Schwarzenegger put his signature- to the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Performance Standard Act' 08 just two days after signing the
highly publicized Global Warming Solutions Act, 10 9 which established
some of the nation's most significant statewide emissions reduction
goals. 110 Although SB 1368 did not receive the worldwide press attention accompanying the Global Warming Solutions Act, it began to
have an immediate impact.
At the time the governor signed SB 1368, six Southern California
cities, which provided significant financing for the coal-fired Inter103. CPUC, Phase 1 Scoping Memo and Notice of Workshop on Interim Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Performance Standard at 4, Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement the
Commission's Procurement Incentive Framework and to Examine the Integration of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into Procurement Policies, Rulemaking 06-04-009
(June 1, 2006), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/EFILE/RULC/56888.pdf.
104. Id.
105. CEED is a non-profit organization formed by the nation's coal-producing companies, railroads, some electric utilities and equipment manufacturers, and related organizations. CPUC, The Center for Energy and Economic Development's Opening Brief on
Jurisdictional and Other Legal Issues, Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement the
Commission's Procurement Incentive Framework and to Examine the Integration of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into Procurement Policies, Rulemaking 06-04-009
(June 30, 2006) [hereinafter CEED Opening Brief].
106. Id. at 5.
107. S.B. 1368, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
108. Assemb. B. 32, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
109. Id.
110. Press Release, Cal. Office of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger Signs
Landmark Legislation to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Sept. 27, 2006), http://gov.
ca.gov/index.php?.press-release/41 11/.
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mountain Power Plant in Utah and received a large amount of their
baseload power 1 ' from that plant, were in the midst of considering
an offer from the plant to extend their long term contracts for an
additional seventeen years, from 2027 through 2044.112 Faced with the
new legislation, Los Angeles turned down the offer. 133 However, when
officials in Burbank and Riverside saw the opportunity to extend their
contracts slipping away, they quickly voted to authorize contract renewal, and Pasadena Water and Power wrote a staff report recom1 14
mending renewal.
Those actions prompted a strongly worded letter of condemnation from California's United States Senator Dianne Feinstein as well
as a rebuke from the office of state Senator Don Perata, who authored
SB 1368.115 Environmental groups, including the Sierra Club and the
Natural Resources Defense Council, also weighed in. 116 Bowing to
public and political pressure, officials in Burbank and Riverside rescinded their approval of the contract extensions, and eventually all
six cities indicated to Intermountain Power they did not intend to ac117
cept the offer.
In response to the cities' rejection of the contract extension, Intermountain Power indicated it would fund a study to evaluate ways in
which it might reduce GHG emissions from the plant, including converting the plant to an IGCC plant or capturing GHGs and sequestering them underground. 118
The Tahoe Donner Public Utility District also faced political heat
from Senators Feinstein and Perata while it debated whether to enter
into a fifty-year contract to purchase electricity from a proposed expansion to the Intermountain Power Plant. 119 The contract would
Baseload power is electricity generation from a power plant that is designed to
111.
provide electricity at least sixty percent of the total hours in a year. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE

§ 8340(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007). Baseload power contracts are for power intended to
meet demand night and day and throughout the year. Senate Third Reading, Bill Analysis
of S.B. 1368, at E (Aug. 21, 2006). They differ from peak power contracts, which are intended to be available only at those times of the year when demand spikes. Id.

112.

David Czamanske, Power by the People: Pasadena, Other Cities Abandon Effort to Skirt

New Global Warming Law, PASADENA WEEKLY, Dec. 7, 2006, http://www.pasadenaweekly.

com/article.php?id=4098&lssueNum=49.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Mark Martin, Truckee: Small Town, Global Issues; Climate Change, Energy Costs at Heart
of Utility District's Vote on Coal-fired Power, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 10, 2006, at BI.
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have helped finance construction of the plant expansion which, in
return, would have supplied the small mountain town of Truckee with
120
much of the electricity it needs.
At two marathon public hearings, townspeople debated whether
it better served the town's long-term interest to have low-cost electricity or to limit GHG emissions. 1 2 1 A large part of Truckee's economy
depends on nearby ski resorts, and residents were concerned that
12 2
global warming was already reducing the Sierra Nevada snowpack.
Ultimately, Utility Board members voted to turn down the contract,
citing coal's contribution to global warming as one of the reasons for
123
their opposition.
C.

Implementing the Law

On January 25, 2007, CPUC adopted regulations implementing
SB 1368.124 The Commission explained that the interim EPS is
needed "to ensure that there is no 'backsliding"' as California transi125
tions to a statewide GHG emissions cap:
If LSEs enter into long-term commitments with high-GHG emitting
baseload plants during this transition, California ratepayers will be
exposed to the high cost of retrofits .

.

. under future emission

control regulations. They will also be exposed to potential supply
disruptions when these high-emitting facilities are taken off line for
retrofits, or retired early .... 126
The Commission set the EPS at a level of 1100 pounds of CO 2 per
megawatt hour. 27 All combined-cycle natural-gas-fired power plants
120. Id.
121. Truckee Donner Pub. Util. Dist., Special Meeting Minutes: Dec. 13, 2006, http://
www.tdpud.org/pdf/Dec. 13,2006,%20minutes-special.pdf.
122. Martin, supra note 119, at B1.
123. Truckee Donner Pub. Util. Dist., supra note 121.
124. CPUC, Interim Opinion on Phase 1 Issues: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Performance Standard, Decision 07-01-039, Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement the Commission's Procurement Incentive Framework and to Examine the Integration of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into Procurement Policies, Rulemaking 06-04-009
(Jan. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Interim Opinion on Phase 1 Issues] , available at http://www.
cpuc.ca.gov/wordpdf/FINALDECISION/64072.pdf.
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 8. CEED objected to the decision to set the EPS at 1,100 pounds per megawatt hour because it would preclude power plants that use oil, coal, petroleum, and coalfueled resources. Id. at 66-67 n.90. In its comments to CPUC's proposed decision, CEED
did not propose a specific EPS level, but the record indicates the EPS would need to be
1,700 or 1,800 pounds per megawatt hour in order for baseload generation using these
resources to be able to meet the standard. Id. at 66.
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were deemed to be in compliance with the EPS. 12 8 Pursuant to SB
1368, the regulations require that all new ownership investments, or
new or renewed contract commitments of five years or more, in
baseload generation to serve California consumers be with power
29
plants that meet the EPS.'
The regulations also require that facilities with multiple generating sources delivering power under a single contract have each generating source evaluated individually. 130 For example, if a power plant
has one generating unit fueled by coal and another generating unit
powered by wind, there will be no blending of the emissions rates in
calculating whether the power plant has met the EPS.
Only two narrow exemptions to the EPS requirement were created: (1) if an LSE could demonstrate that a long-term contract or
commitment to a non-compliant power plant was necessary to address
reliability concerns or (2) because of "extraordinary circumstances,
catastrophic events, or threat of significant financial harm."''
On February 23, 2007, CEED filed an application for a rehearing
of CPUC's decision to adopt the regulations. 132 CEED's objections
128. Id. at 4-5. However, if units are added to a deemed compliant natural-gas-fired
power plant that add fifty megawatts or more to the plant's rated capacity, the plant must
meet the EPS. Id. at 5-6.
129. Id. at 4-5. A "new ownership investment" is: an investment in new construction of
a baseload power plant; acquisition of new or additional ownership interest in an existing
baseload power plant previously owned by others; any investment intended to extend the
life of one or more generating units at an existing LSE-owned power plant for five years or
more; any investment that results in a net increase in the existing rated capacity of the
power plant; or any investment designed and intended to convert a non-baseload plant to a
baseload plant. Id. at 66.
130. Id. at 10.
131. Id. at 22. On May 23, 2007, CEC adopted rules pursuant to SB 1368 that were
similar to those adopted by CPUC. Cal. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, Order
Adopting Regulations and Approving Negative Declaration, Order No. 07-0523-7, Proposed Adoption of Regulations Establishing a Greenhouse Gases Emission Performance
Standard for Baseload Generation of Locally Publicly Owned Electric Utility Companies,
No. 06-OIR-1 (May 29, 2007), http://www.energy.ca.gov/ghgstandards/notices/2007-0523_ORDERADOPTNGREGSNEGDECLARATION.PDF. By statute, CEC was required
to submit its rules for review to the Office of Administrative Law ("OAL"). Cal. Office of
Admin. Law, Decision Regarding Disapproval of a Rulemaking Action at 2, File No. 077
0601-04S (June 29, 2007), http://www.energy.ca.gov/ghgstandards/documents/200 -0702_OALDISAPPROVALDECISION.PDF. On June 29, 2007, OAL disapproved CEC's
rulemaking action because it did not demonstrate a need for certain exemptions, such as
for investments that result in a ten percent or less increase in rated capacity, or for additions to deemed-compliant power plants that result in an increase of less than fifty megawatts. Id. at 1-2. As of this writing the CEC had not yet adopted changes to its regulations
in response to the disapproval.
132. CPUC, Center for Energy and Economic Development's Application for Rehearing of Decision 07-01-039, Interim Opinion on Phase 1 Issues: Greenhouse Gas Emissions
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were based in large part on arguments that the regulations were preempted by federal regulation and policy1 3 3 and that they violated the
134
dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
On May 25, 2007, CPUC denied the application for rehearing
135
As
stating that no grounds for rehearing had been demonstrated.
CPUC explained in its decision, and as will be shown in the next section, there is no federal legislation that preempts SB 1368 and no dormant Commerce Clause violation.

III.

Dormant Commerce Clause Inquiry

The regional nature of the deregulated electricity marketplace
has pushed California and other states to enact legislation that has
impacts on electricity generation beyond their borders, triggering a
seemingly inevitable dormant Commerce Clause challenge. Proponents of deregulation view it as a necessary mechanism to develop and
nurture reliable sources of power, and they view the low cost of electricity generation as paramount. 136 Critics insist that the environmental impacts and full social costs of electricity generation must be
considered when permitting decisions for new or expanded power
1 37
plants are made.

Performance Standard, Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement the Commission's
Procurement Incentive Framework and to Examine the Integration of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards into Procurement Policies, Rulemaking 06-04-009 (Feb. 23, 2007)
[hereinafter Ctr. for Energy & Econ. Dev.], available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/EFILE/R/
64911.pdf.
133. Id. at 19.
134. Id. at 3.
135. CPUC, Order Denying Rehearing of Decision 07-01-039 at 1, Decision 07-65-003,
Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement the Commission's Procurement Incentive
Framework and to Examine the Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into
Procurement Policies, Rulemaking 06-04-009 (May 24, 2007), available at http://www.cpuc.
ca.gov/wordpdf/FINALDECISION/68325.pdf. As of this writing the CPUC's decision
had not been appealed.
136. SeeJoel Eisen, The Environmental Responsibility of the Regionalizing Electric Utility Industry, 15 DuKE ENvrL. L. & PoL'Y F. 295, 301 (2005).
137. Id. Burning coal is considered one of the least expensive methods of generating
electricity. Seth Borenstein, Carbon-Emissions Culprit? Coal, SEArLE TIMES, June 3, 2007,
0 3
.html. Thus,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003732690_carbon
for those who think the cost of electricity should be the primary factor in determining what
kind of plant gets built, coal is the favored option. However, critics argue that when the
costs of air pollution, mercury pollution, respiratory illness, and climate change are factored into the cost of electricity generated by coal-fired power plants, coal is not the least
expensive option. Sierra Club, Coal Questions and Answers, http://www.sierraclub.org/
coal/questions (last visited Aug. 31, 2007).
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The ongoing tug-of-war between state environmental regulations
and regional marketplaces is winding up in court with increasing frequency. As Steven Ferrey has noted, "The construction of the dormant
Commerce Clause is one of the most litigated environmental and en138
ergy issues before the Supreme Court in the last quarter century."
Given the contentious history, the authors of both SB 1368 and
CPUC regulations were well aware that they would likely have to withstand a dormant Commerce Clause challenge. 139 They have met the
test.
A.

Federal Preemption

The analysis of SB 1368 and its validity under the dormant Commerce Clause begins first with the threshold question of federal preemption. Before a court begins a dormant Commerce Clause analysis,
it asks whether Congress has regulated the particular economic activity implicated by the state law to the extent that federal legislation
occupies the entire field of that activity. 140 If the court finds that federal legislation does occupy the entire field, either explicitly or implicitly, then the federal legislation preempts the state law 14 t and the
court's inquiry need go no further.
The Act clearly passes this threshold test. There is no federal law
instituting a mandatory GHG emissions standard as part of a cap and
trade program for power plants. The Senate never ratified the Kyoto
Protocol. 14 2 In place of mandatory regulations, the federal government has instituted programs through which industries may volunta138. Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Poicy, and States' Rzghts: Discerning
the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 50, 579
(2004) (noting that the issue of bans on or discouragement of interstate waste transport
has been before the Supreme Court seven times since 1978).
139. See Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, Duke Univ., Northeast Plan to Extend
Climate Cap Raises Constztutional Questions, July 19, 2006, http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/
institute/news-neclimate.html. While the CPUC was taking comments it received a letter
from the Wyoming Infrastructure Authority that argued the Standard was discriminatory
because it targeted coal generation.
[O]nly coal generation cannot meet the standard .... The standard thus discriminates against a source of generation and a fuel that does not exist in-state in favor
of generation and fuels that do. This discrimination against commerce would be
sufficient by itself to place the GHG standard in legal peril.
Id.
140. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 381 (2d ed. 2005).
141. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
142. Hiatt, supra note 10, at A13.
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rily reduce their GHG emissions. 143 The voluntary nature of the
federal programs has left the field open for states to impose
mandatory reductions in power plants' GHG emissions.
However, Yvonne Gross argues that state cap and trade programs
that regulate GHG emissions are implicitly preempted under the
Supremacy Clause through field preemption.' 44 Congress, by enacting
the Federal Power Act, granted the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") "exclusive authority to regulate the transmission
and wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce." 1' 45 In addition, she argues that Congress, at least for the present, intended to
occupy the entire field of GHG emissions reductions with a non-regulatory approach where entities would voluntarily reduce their carbon
dioxide emissions. 146 CEED makes many of the same claims in its application for rehearing of the CPUC decision, arguing that Congress
incenhas chosen to occupy the field of GHG regulation by providing
14 7
study.
and
research,
development,
technology
tives for
The few voluntary programs that Gross refers to, and the research
and technology development incentives that CEED describes, fall far
short of the comprehensive federal legislation required to preempt
state law in this area.' 48 Where the area of regulation is one traditionally reserved for local or state police power regulation, courts must
exercise a strong presumption against implied federal preemption in
the absence of evidence of the "clear and manifest purpose of
Congress."'

49

Regulation of utilities that provide electricity to local retail customers is a police power long reserved to the states-FERC has no
jurisdiction over such utilities.1 50 The voluntary GHG emissions reduction programs Gross refers to were established by the executive
branch, 51 not by Congress, and are not evidence that it is the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt the state police power
143. See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratoriesfor Local Solutions for Global Problems: State,
Local and Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate
Change, 12 PENN. ST. ENrL. L. REv, 15, 23-24 (2004), for a description of federal voluntary
programs.
144. Yvonne Gross, Kyoto, Congress, or Bust: The ConstitutionalInvalidity of State C0 2 Capand-Trade Programs, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 205, 230 (2005).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 232.
147. Ctr. for Energy & Econ. Dev., supra note 132, at 21-22.
148. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1985).
149. Id. at 715.
150. McKinstry, supra note 143, at 82 n.317.
151. See Gross, supra note 144, at 230.
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in this area. Therefore, SB 1368 is not preempted by federal law; the
dispositive question is whether the law is constitutionally permissible
in light of the dormant Commerce Clause.
B.

Broad Policies of the Dormant Commerce Clause

In examining the possible dormant Commerce Clause challenges
to the Act and its regulations, it is useful to understand the reasons
why the doctrine was established. Article I, Section 8, clause 3 of the
United States Constitution states that Congress shall have the power
"[t] o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes."' 152 Thus, the Constitution grants
Congress the power to make laws that regulate interstate commerce.
The United States Supreme Court developed the "dormant" or "negative" Commerce Clause doctrine to address situations where Congress
has not acted, but a state or local law discriminates against or unduly
153
burdens interstate commerce.
There are three traditional policy arguments for the existence of
the dormant Commerce Clause-historical, economic, and political. 154 In H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,155 the Supreme Court
presented the historical and economic arguments for the doctrine.
The Court explained that the Framers wanted to create a Constitution
that would stop the "drift toward anarchy and commercial warfare between states" after the Revolutionary War, and that it was the Framers'
intention to prevent state laws that interfered with interstate commerce.1 5 6 The Court emphasized that the nation's economy has
thrived because there are open markets between the states, and no
state may "promote its own economic advantages by curtailment or
57
burdening of interstate commerce."'
Thus, a fundamental historic and economic policy reason for the
dormant Commerce Clause is the promotion of free trade between
the states. The fundamental evil which the dormant Commerce
Clause seeks to prevent is state economic protectionism.
The Supreme Court has also found a political justification for the
dormant Commerce Clause. If the burden of a law passed by one state
falls primarily on those in another state, "legislative action is not likely
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 3.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 385.
Id.
336 U.S. 525 (1939).
Id. at 533.
Id. at 532.
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to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted
on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the
state. " 1 58 The Court has explained that the dormant Commerce

Clause is needed so that states and their citizens will not be harmed by
laws in other states where they lack political representation. 159
While the Court has established a doctrine that protects the "in160
terstate movement of goods against local burdens and repressions,"'
the Court has also recognized that a state has broad power "to protect
its inhabitants against perils to health or safety, fraudulent traders and
highway hazards, even by use of measures which bear adversely upon
16
interstate commerce." 1
In the seminal dormant Commerce Clause case, Gibbons v.
Ogden, 162 Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that laws which are a valid
exercise of a state's police power should be upheld, even if they have a
"considerable influence on commerce.'1 63

[They are] a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which
embraces every thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government: all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws,
quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for
regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which respect turnpike
roads, ferries, etc., are component parts of this
64
mass.1

It has been 183 years since Gibbons, but the Court still invokes the
16 5
underlying policies of the Clause in explaining its decisions.
Turning to the Act, and viewing it in the context of the broad
policies of the dormant Commerce Clause, it is clear that the Act does
not contradict the policies behind the doctrine. First, SB 1368 does
not promote economic protectionism. It does not give California businesses an economic advantage over businesses in other states because
the GHG emissions standard applies to all electricity providers, both
in-state and out-of-state, who wish to enter into long term contracts
with California utilities.
Second, the burden of the law does not fall primarily on residents
outside of California. The consumers who will ultimately buy electric158.
159.
160.

S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 385.
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 US. at 538.

161.
162.

Id. at 531-32.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).

163.

Id. at 203.

164.

Id.

165.

CHEMERINSKY,

supra note 140, at 389.
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ity from the utilities affected by the Act live in California. If the Act
has any adverse affect on the price of electricity in California, California consumers will bear the burden. Instead of burdening out-of-state
residents, the law will probably benefit them. For example, if coalfired power plants are modified in the future to capture GHGs and
other harmful emissions that pollute the areas around coal-fired
power plants, out-of-state residents will have cleaner air to breathe.
Third, the Act regulates the purchase and distribution of electricity within California,1 66 which is a valid exercise of the State's police
power to regulate its own internal commerce. In addition, the Act is
intended to protect California residents against perils to their health,
safety, and well being caused by global warming. Thus, SB 1368 is a
valid exercise of the State's police power and should be upheld, even
if it has a considerable influence on interstate commerce.
C.

Contemporary Dormant Commerce Clause Tests

The tests that courts use in their dormant Commerce Clause analyses have evolved since Gibbons. However, the initial inquiry is the
same-whether the subject of the state regulation is a matter of inter16 7
state commerce.
SB 1368 regulates the purchase and distribution of electricity in
California. The Supreme Court has found electricity to be an item of
interstate commerce. 168 "[I]t is difficult to conceive of a more basic
element of interstate commerce than electric energy, a product used
in virtually every home and every commercial or manufacturing facility." 6 9 In addition, transmissions of electricity on interconnected na1 70
tional grids have been found to be an item of interstate commerce.
Therefore, the Act does regulate an activity which is an item of interstate commerce.
If the court finds that the regulated activity is an item of interstate
commerce, the court will apply the appropriate dormant Commerce
Clause tests. Courts generally use three tests for determining whether
a law is valid under the dormant Commerce Clause: (1) Does the law
discriminate against interstate commerce? 1 71 (2) If the law is not dis166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

S.B. 1368, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 389.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982).
Id.
New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 535 U.S. 1, 16 (2002).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 382.
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criminatory, does it place an undue burden upon interstate com173
merce? 172 Or (3) is the law an attempt to regulate extraterritorially?
1. SB 1368 Does Not Discriminate Against Interstate Commerce
Under the first test, a state law may violate the dormant Commerce Clause if it discriminates against out-of-state interests.1 74 State
laws discriminate if they treat in-state and out-of-state economic interests in a way that benefits in-state interests and burdens out-of-state
interests. 175 Some laws are facially discriminatory, drawing a clear distinction between in-state and out-of-state interests.1 76 Some laws are
the purfacially neutral, but are deemed discriminatory if they have 17
7
pose or effect of discriminating against out-of-state interests.
Where a state law discriminates against out-of-state economic interests as a matter of simple protectionism, it faces a virtually per se
rule of invalidity under the Commerce Clause.' 78 For example, a New
Jersey law that banned the importation of out-of-state waste for disposal in New Jersey landfills, but allowed disposal of in-state waste, was
found to be facially discriminatory, an unjustified protectionist mea179
sure, and thus invalid.
The law was struck down even though it was intended to protect
the local environment and not the local economy. 180 The Court said it
did not matter that the State wished to prevent its remaining open
space from turning into landfills, because a state cannot seek to
achieve a legitimate goal by the illegitimate means of isolating itself
from the national economy. 18 "What is crucial is the attempt by one
State to isolate itself from a problem common to many by erecting a
182
barrier against the movement of interstate trade.
However, in a recent dormant Commerce Clause decision, United
Haulers Association, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Au172.
173.

Id. at 414.
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).

174.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 382.

175. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005).
176. Id.
177. For example, a law that imposed an assessment on all milk sold to Massachusetts
retailers was found to have a discriminatory purpose because the assessed funds were used
to aid only Massachusetts dairy farmers. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186
(1994).
178. Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 621.
181. Id. at 628.
182. Id.
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thority,'8 3 the Court created an important public benefit versus private
commerce distinction.18 4 "The Commerce Clause significantly limits
the ability of States and localities to regulate or otherwise burden the
flow of interstate commerce, but it does not elevate free trade above
all other values.' 1 8

5

The ruling may make it easier for state laws that

benefit the local environment, but impact out-of-state industry, to
withstand dormant Commerce Clause challenges.
In United Haulers, the Court held that when a state law favors a
public interest corporation over out-of-state competition it does not
discriminate against interstate commerce.' 8 6 The law at issue required
local trash haulers to dispose of their loads at a state-owned facility, so
that the waste could be sorted and disposed of properly in local landfills. 1 87 The trash haulers complained that they could dispose of their

trash more cheaply at out-of-state facilities, and the requirement that
haulers dump their loads at the publicly owned in-state facility dis18 8
criminated against out-of-state businesses.
The law was passed in response to an environmental crisis where
many local landfills were operating without permits and in violation of
state regulations. Sixteen landfills were ordered to close and remediate the surrounding environment, costing the public tens of millions
of dollars.'8 9 The "tipping" fees that the state-owned facility charged
trash haulers were significantly higher than those charged on the
open market. 9 0° The fees, however, funded recycling, composting,
household hazardous waste disposal, and other services in addition to
disposal.' 9' The Court held that a law that favors local government at
the expense of private industry, whether in-state or out-of-state, does
not discriminate. 19 2 The Court explained it was particularly hesitant to
interfere with the law because waste disposal is typically and traditionally a function of local government exercising its police power. "The
dormant Commerce Clause is not a roving license for federal courts to
decide what activities are appropriate for state and local government
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

127 S. Ct. 1787 (2007).
Id.
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986).
United HaulersAss'n, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 1798.
Id. at 1790-91.
Id. at 1787.
Id. at 1790.
Id. at 1791.
Id.
Id.
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to undertake, and what activities must be the province of private market competition."

193

United Haulers sets an important precedent for SB 1368, which is
also an exercise of local police power intended to benefit the local
environment and which is at the expense of some, but not all, out-ofstate electric generators.
a.

The Act Does Not Discriminate on Its Face

Applying the discrimination test to SB 1368, it is clear that the law
is not facially discriminatory. It makes no distinction between electricity that is generated in-state and electricity that is generated out-ofstate. It also does not distinguish between electricity purchased from
generators that use oil, natural gas, coal, wind power, solar-energy
power, hydroelectric power, or any other source of energy. All electricity purchased by California utilities through long-term contracts
and subject to the Act must meet the same GHG EPS.
SB 1368 is distinguishable from the law struck down in Philadelphia v. New Jersey,' 94 which blocked the flow of all out-of-state waste
into New Jersey, thus treating out-of-state waste differently than waste
created in-state.' 95 Under the Act, electricity that is generated out-ofstate will not be blocked at California's border simply because of its
geographic origin. Electricity from out-of-state generators will be allowed to enter the California market as long as it meets the EPS which
is imposed on every electricity generator or seller subject to the Act.
According to a table prepared by CEC, many out-of-state power plants
already meet the EPS and would be able to sell electricity to California
utilities under the Act, including one out-of-state power plant that re96
lies in large part on coal.'
The Act is also distinguishable from the regulation in Philadelphia
v. New Jersey because California is not seeking to "isolate itself in the
stream of interstate commerce from a problem shared by all."'1 97 In193.

Id. at 1796.

194.

437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).

195. Id. at 629.
196. CPUC, Reply to Center for Energy and Economic Development Comments for
the People of the State of California, ex rel. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General at 5-6, Rulemaking to Implement the Commission's Procurement Incentive Framework and to Examine
the Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into Procurement Policies,
Rulemaking 06-04-009 (Nov. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Attorney General Reply] (discussing the
Standard, which was implemented by CPUC on January 25, 2007, and set a limit of 1,100
pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt hour).
197. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 629.
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stead, California is using its considerable influence within the stream
of interstate commerce to tackle a problem shared by all-global climate change. California realizes that it cannot isolate itself from
global warming. It must act in the most effective way it can, which is to
influence the marketplace.

b.

SB 1368 Does Not Have Discriminatory Purposes or Effects

The purposes for enacting SB 1368 are also not discriminatory.
The stated purposes are to reduce California's contributions to global
warming and to protect California consumers from financial risks and
reliability problems that may result from future federal regulation. 198
Opponents of the Act have not claimed that it was enacted for any
discriminatory purpose. However, they have charged that the Act has
discriminatory effects.
CEED argued that the EPS has an unconstitutional discriminatory effect on interstate commerce because the impacts would fall
heavily on out-of-state coal-fired power plants.
[T] he ability of out-of-state coal-fueled generation plants to export
their electricity into California [would] be severely limited, if not
foreclosed altogether. The limitation of CO 2 emissions described
by CPUC effectively precludes in-state utilities and other load-serving entities from the purchase and importation of coal-fueled
generation.1 99
However, in Exxon v. Governor of Maryland,200 the Supreme Court
stated, "[ft]he fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some
interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce." 20 1 In Exxon, the Court found
that a Maryland statute which banned producers or refiners of petroleum products from operating retail gas stations within the State did
not have a discriminatory effect, even though the burden fell entirely
on out-of-state companies that refined or produced gasoline. 20 2 The
Court stated that the statute did not discriminate because it did not
create barriers against interstate petroleum marketers who did not refine or produce gasoline, and it did not favor local producers or refiners of petroleum products because there were none. 20 3 The Court
acknowledged that gasoline consumers might switch from buying gas
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

S.B. 1368, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. § I(e)(k) (Cal. 2006).
CEED Opening Brief, supra note 105, at 7.
437 U.S. 117 (1978).
Id. at 126.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 125.
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from company-operated gas stations to buying it from independent
dealers. 20 4 However, "the [Commerce] Clause protects the interstate
market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burden205
some regulations."
In light of Exxon, it is clear there is no merit to CEED's argument
that the Act has an impermissible discriminatory effect because the
burden falls heavily on out-of-state coal-fired power plants. While an
effect of the Act might be that California utilities switch from buying
electricity from out-of-state conventional coal-fired power plants to
buying electricity from other out-of-state sources, that would not be an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce because electricity
would still be able to flow into California from out-of-state companies.
CEED also argued the EPS is discriminatory in effect because it
places a heightened financial burden on the construction of new coalfired power plants in neighboring states.
The initial capital required to construct a power plant is typically
secured with pre-construction contracts for the output of the unit.
If California is effectively closed to coal-fueled power due to the
EPS, reduced potential market breadth makes securing financing
for construction of 20
new
coal-fueled power plants in all Western
6
states more difficult.
Again, CEED equated burdening companies that operate conventional coal-fired power plants with impermissibly burdening interstate
commerce. However, the Commerce Clause does not require California to help coal companies build more power plants in other states. As
the Attorney General stated, " [W] hile California cannot simply exclude all power generated in other states, neither is it required to
maintain a certain level of import ....
California is not the financial
20 7
guarantor for other states and their construction projects."
In summary, the Act does not discriminate against interstate commerce because it does not treat in-state and out-of-state economic interests differently, it is not protectionist, it does not have a
discriminatory purpose, and it does not have discriminatory effects
that benefit in-state interests at the expense of out-of-state interests.

2.

SB 1368 Is Not an Undue Burden on Interstate Commerce

The second dormant Commerce Clause test is applied where a
law does not discriminate on its face or have a discriminatory purpose
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 127.
CEED Opening Brief, supra note 105, at 8.
Attorney General Reply, supra note 196, at 8.
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or effect. 20 8 In that case, the court will balance the interests of the
09
2

state against the burden the law places upon interstate commerce.
In Pike v. Bruce Church,210 the Supreme Court articulated the balancing test used to determine whether nondiscriminatory state laws
and regulations are valid under the Commerce Clause:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
be promoted as well with a lesser
involved, and on whether it could
211
impact on interstate activities.
As the language of Pike makes clear, in order to pass the balancing test a state law must effectuate a legitimate local interest. If those
local interests relate to the health, safety, and welfare of the state's
2 12
The Supreme Court
citizens, the law is more likely to pass muster.
has stated:
[T]he Constitution when "conferring upon Congress the regulation of commerce, * * * never intended to cut the States off from
legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life, and safety of
their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the
commerce of the country. Legislation, in a great variety of ways,
may affect commerce and persons engaged in it without constitut2 13
ing a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution."
a.

The EPS Has Substantial Local Benefits

SB 1368 has two kinds of benefits, economic and environmental,
and both relate to the health, safety, and welfare of California citizens.
The EPS provides an economic benefit because it protects ratepayers
from the costs and risks of complying with future GHG regulations
and protects the reliability of the grid. 21 4 Ensuring there is a reliable
source of electricity to power traffic systems and hospitals relates to
the health, safety, and welfare of California citizens.
The EPS also benefits the health, safety, and welfare of California
citizens by protecting the local environment. A reduction in GHG
208.

CHEMERINSKY,

209.

Id.

210.
211.

397 U.S. 137 (1970).
Id. at 142 (citation omitted).

212.
213.
214.

Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 428 (1963).
Id.
Interim Opinion on Phase I Issues, supra note 124, at 3.

supra note 140, at 414.
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emissions may prevent the adverse impacts of climate change
including:
[E]xacerbation of air quality problems, a reduction in the quality
and supply of water to the state from the Sierra snowpack, a rise in
sea levels resulting in the displacement of thousands of coastal
businesses and residences, damage to marine ecosystems and the
natural environment, and an increase in the incidences of infectious diseases,
asthma, and other human health-related
215
problems.
Some opponents of state-imposed GHG emissions reductions
question whether actions taken by an individual state will result in any
local environmental benefit. Commentator Yvonne Gross has argued
that the local environmental benefits of state GHG emissions reduc2 16
tions are too speculative to justify mandatory GHG reductions.
[I] t is questionable whether a state-level cap-and-trade program
would produce any environmental benefits for the state. Indeed,
due to concerns about leakage and contract shuffling, it is not certain that a state-level employed program would achieve any net reductions in CO 2 emissions. Additionally, due to the lack of
consensus among scientists regarding the nexus between GHGs
and climate change, it is not entirely certain that reduction
of CO 2
2 17
will further result in any positive environmental goal.
Given the serious threat that climate change poses to California's
environment and its citizens, and the significant amount of GHGs that
California emits, there is more than enough justification for arguing
that regulations that reduce California's emissions, especially when
combined with other states' and countries' efforts, will effectuate a
legitimate local environmental interest. A state should not be denied
the right to pass a law that reduces GHG emissions because that particular law may make only a small impact on global warming. It would
surely be perverse if states could not regulate problems because they
are widespread and pervasive. The dormant Commerce Clause should
not preclude state action because the state cannot solve the problem it
is intending to solve alone. A state should at least be allowed to do its
part to address the problems it faces.
The Supreme Court has recognized that those who challenge a
law on the grounds of being only a small incremental step toward solving a large problem make an erroneous assumption:
[A]ccepting that premise would doom most challenges to regulatory action. Agencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve
215.
216.
217.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
Gross, supra note 144, at 7.
Id. at 229.

§ 38501 (a) (West Supp. 2007).
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They instead
massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop ....
whitde away at them over time, refining their preferred approach
develop a more-nuanced unas circumstances change and as they218
derstanding of how best to proceed.
b.

The Burdens on Interstate Commerce Are Only Incidental

Once the nature of the local interests has been analyzed, the next
step in the Pike balancing test is an analysis of the burdens on interstate commerce and whether the burdens are clearly excessive in relation to the benefits. 2 19 One way to measure the extent of a law's
interstate burden is by the degree that the state's law shifts the costs of
regulating to other states. "[W] hen state legislation nominally of local
concern, is in point of fact aimed at interstate commerce or by its
necessary operation is a means of gaining a local benefit by throwing
the attendant burdens on those outside the state," it violates the Com220
merce Clause.
As discussed previously, CEED has argued that the EPS imposes
several burdens on those outside the state: it severely limits the ability
of coal-fired power plants to export their electricity to California, it
makes securing financing for the construction of new coal-fired power
plants more difficult, and it will depress the price of electricity in excoalporting states because there will be a surplus of electricity from
22 1
California.
to
supply
their
sell
cannot
that
plants
power
fired
These burdens only fall on some out-of-state generators and the
restrictions on those generators who are burdened will be lifted if the
generators invest in technology that reduces their GHG emissions to
the point that they meet the EPS. Ultimately, the cost of complying
with the regulation will be the cost of making modifications or building new plants that meet the EPS.
If coal-fired power plants wish to enter into new long term contracts with California utilities, the plants will eventually make the mod-

ifications and pass the costs to California utilities. Accordingly,
California utilities and ratepayers, not out-of-state companies, will ultimately bear the costs.
Furthermore, because the EPS encourages electricity generators
to adopt technology that, as a side benefit, reduces local air pollution
as well as GHG emissions, the standard provides a benefit to the states
218.
219.
220.
221.

Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1457 (2007).
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455 (1992).
S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1938).
See supra Part III.C.1.b.
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where conventional coal-fired power plants serving California are located. 222 As the California Attorney General pointed out, rather than
shifting the costs to other states, the EPS "represents an effort by California to avoid creating environmental externalities in its consumption of electricity," externalities which are in many cases borne by
22 3
residents of other states.

A regulation's interstate burden may also be measured by the degree to which the regulation conflicts with the regulations of other
states. 224 One may argue that California's EPS conflicts with the lack
of a standard in other states. Even if California's EPS does conflict
with other states that do not regulate GHG emissions, the EPS is not
an unreasonable burden because it is an innovative safety measure.
In Bibb v. Navajo FreightLines,225 the United States Supreme Court
held that an Illinois requirement for a different kind of mudflaps on
trucks traveling within the state was an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. 2 26 The Court also found, however, that although a
state safety measure might place a great burden of delay and inconvenience on interstate carriers, such regulation is not necessarily invalid
because a new safety device may be so compelling that the innovating
227
state should not be the one to give way.
California's innovative GHG emissions standard requires coalfired power plants to install devices which lower their GHG emissions
and other pollutants, making them safer to the public. The need for
these devices is so compelling that, even if conflict is found, California
should not be required to give way.
In many ways the Act is analogous to a Minnesota law that the
Supreme Court upheld after it balanced the local benefits of the law
against the burdens on interstate commerce and found that the law
did not place an undue burden on interstate commerce. 2 28 The Min-

nesota law banned the sale of milk in plastic non-returnable containers but allowed its sale in non-returnable paperboard milk cartons. 2 29
It was enacted for environmental purposes-to encourage the use of
222. See CTR. FOR

ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE TECHS. ET AL., supra note 24, at vi-ix.
223. CPUC, Phase 1, Legal Issues Reply Brief of the People of the State of California, ex
rel. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General at 6, Rulemaking 06-04-009 (July 10, 2006) [hereinafter
Attorney General Phase 1 Brief].
224. See, e.g., Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 109 (2001).
225. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 530.
228. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 474 (1980).
229. Id. at 456.
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environmentally-superior containers, to prevent the in-state milk industry from becoming reliant on the new throwaway plastic contain2 30
ers, to ease solid waste disposal problems, and conserve energy.
After applying the Pike balancing test, the Court in Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 23 1 held that "[e]ven granting that the out-of-state

plastics industry is burdened relatively more heavily than the Minnesota pulpwood industry,

. .

. [the] burden [was] not 'clearly excessive'

23 2
in light of the [statute's stated benefits]."
Applying the dormant Commerce Clause tests to SB 1368 in the
same manner the Court applied it in Clover Leaf results in a similar
conclusion. First, the Act does not discriminate and it is not protectionist. Applying the Pike balancing test, the environmental benefits of
California's EPS are similar to those the Court found sufficient in Clover Leaf The EPS promotes the generation of electricity using environmentally-superior means; it prevents California utilities from relying
further on electricity generated by high GHG emitting power plants; it
eases global warming (by reducing the "disposal" of GHGs into the
atmosphere); and it conserves energy by encouraging efficiency.
The burdens of the EPS may be felt more by out-of-state coalfired power plants than by other plants out-of-state or in-state. However, as the California Attorney General pointed out, "[t]he burden
on interstate commerce from the standard would be slight, since elec'2 33
tricity can continue to move freely across California's borders."
Therefore the burdens would not be excessive in light of the benefits
of the EPS.

c.

Alternatives Are Not Feasible or Effective

The final factor in the Pike test is whether the state's interests
could be promoted as well with a lesser burden on interstate commerce. 234 It is difficult to identify alternatives that are less burdensome while achieving the same GHG emission reductions as those
required by SB 1368. The State has already instituted several measures
intended to cut GHG emissions associated with electricity generation.
The Act's reductions are meant to supplement those achieved by the
other measures.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 465-69.
449 U.S. 456 (1980).
Id. at 473.
Attorney General Phase 1 Brief, supra note 223, at 8.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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For example, as discussed in Part I, California already has the
most aggressive energy efficiency goals in the nation. In addition,
CPUC has adopted a renewable portfolio standard requiring utilities
to procure twenty percent of their power from renewable sources,
both in-stateand out-of-state, by 2017.235 The action taken by California in reducing its GHG emissions 23 6 is still insufficient to truly address the threat of global warming. The consequences of global
warming are so severe that California must find other ways to reduce
the GHG emissions associated with its electricity consumption.
One possible alternative to setting an EPS would be to allow
power plants to achieve emission reductions through carbon offsets.
Instead of installing new technology to reduce their GHG emissions,
power plants could invest in carbon offset projects, such as reforestation, and get credit for the GHG emission reductions achieved by
those projects.
However, in its decision adopting the EPS, CPUC explained that
although offsets will likely be a component of the cap and trade system in the future, allowing them at this point in the process would be
counterproductive.
The objective of the interim EPS .

is to ensure that there is no

"backsliding" as California transitions to a statewide GHG emissions cap. This objective cannot be accomplished if LSEs are permitted to comply with the standard by .

.

.

increasing the

permissible level of emissions for non-compliant powerplants
through offsets or other means. These options would only serve to
disguise the types of problems that the EPS is designed to avoid,
e.g., the high costs of future plant retrofits and reliability disruptions .... 237
Another alternative to the EPS is the use of a GHG adder in the
utility procurement process. "Carbon adders account for the potential
future costs of mitigating GHG emissions in the event national legislation is adopted and, as such are an expected future price for CO 2 that
' 23 8
is assumed when comparing investment options."
In its decision, CPUC found that carbon adders would not further the goal of preventing utilities from making long-term commitments to power plants with high GHG emissions. 239 The Commission
explained that while adders may be a disincentive to procuring elec235. S.B. 1078, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).
236. See generally S.B. 1368, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006); S.B. 1078, 2002 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2002).
237. Interim Opinion on Phase I Issues, supra note 124, at 24-25.
238. Gross, supra note 144, at 227.
239. Interim Opinion on Phase I Issues, supra note 124, at 33-34.
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tricity from such sources, utilities would still be allowed to procure

240
from the "dirtiest resources" in some cases.
Another alternative to the EPS would be to require utilities to
insert clauses in their procurement contracts providing that power
plants bear the increased costs of generating electricity caused by federal legislation, and forbidding them from passing those costs on to
their customers. However, such clauses can create a reliability risk.
Faced with similar constraints on passing increased costs on to consumers during the California electricity crisis, one power plant simply
24
shut down. 1
Because there are no feasible alternatives less burdensome to interstate commerce that would achieve the same benefits as the Act,
and because the benefits outweigh the incidental burdens, the Act is
not an undue burden on interstate commerce.

3.

SB 1368 Is Not Extraterritorial Legislation

The third way in which a state law can violate the dormant Commerce Clause is if it is considered an attempt to regulate extraterritorially. 24 2 The critical questions are whether a state statute regulates
commerce that occurs wholly outside the state, and whether the statute has the practical effect of controlling conduct outside the bounda243
ries of the state.
For example, the New York law struck down in Brown-Forman Distillers v. New York State Liquor Authority244 prevented distillers from selling liquor in other states at a price greater than that which they had
committed to sell their liquor in New York. 245 The Illinois statute
struck down in Edgar v. MITE, Corp.246 conditioned the acceptance of
tender offers by multinational companies incorporated in other states
247
upon the registration of such offers in Illinois.
In Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc.,24 8 a case involving a price affirmation statute similar to the one in Brown-Forman, the United States Su240. Id. at 34.
241. CPUC, The Natural Resources Defense Council's Opening Brief on Phase 1 Legal
Issues Associated with the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Performance Standards 23-24,
Rulemaking 06-04-009 (June 30, 2006).
242. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
243. Id.
244. 476 U.S. 573, 573 (1986).
245. Id.
246. 457 U.S. 624, 624 (1982).
247. Id.
248. 491 U.S. 324.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

preme Court summarized the four principles it had derived from
prior cases involving extraterritoriality:
First, the "Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a
state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the
State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within
Second, a statute that directly controls commerce
the State ......
occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State's authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute's extraterritorial reach was intended by
the legislature. The critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of
the regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the
State. Third, the practical effect of the statute must be evaluated
not only by considering the consequences of the statute itself, but
also by considering how the challenged statute may interact with
the legitimate regulatory regimes of other States and what effect
would arise if not one, but many or every, State adopted similar
legislation. Generally speaking, the Commerce Clause protects
against inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one
state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State. And,
specifically, the Commerce Clause dictates that no State may force
in one State
an out-of-state merchant to seek regulatory approval
249
before undertaking a transaction in another.
Analyzing the EPS under the first principle, the GHG emissions
standard is not extraterritorial because it does not regulate commerce
that takes place wholly outside of California's borders. The EPS will
affect the sale of electricity from power plants both within and outside
of California. In addition, the majority of the commerce affected, the
acts of entering into and carrying through with long-term financial
commitments for electricity procurement, will occur inside California.
The critical question under the second principle is whether the
practical effect of a statute is to directly control conduct occurring
wholly outside the boundaries of the state. The Act does not directly
control conduct in another state. An out-of-state coal-fired power
plant may choose to alter its conduct to meet California's EPS, but it is
equally free not to by selling its electricity to another state. Any economic effects of the EPS, such as lowering electricity prices in the exporting state, or discouraging the construction of new coal-fired
power plants, would be indirect, and therefore do not constitute di250
rect regulation of interstate commerce.

249. Id. at 336-37 (citing Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579, 582, 642-43) (citations
omitted).
250. Attorney General Reply, supra note 196, at 8 (citing Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 29
Cal. Rptr. 3d 462 (Ct. App. 2005)).
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The EPS is not extraterritorial under the third principle because
the EPS does not project California's regulatory scheme into the jurisdiction of another state. Other states are not required to regulate the
GHG emissions of their electricity generators.
If every state were to adopt its own GHG emissions performance
standard there might be a problem with inconsistency. However there
is always the possibility that a state regulation may potentially conflict
with a future regulation passed by another state. That potential for
conflict should not hamstring a state's ability to solve its problems.
At this point most states that have begun to set GHG emissions
caps are working in conjunction with other states in their respective
regions in order to avoid the problem of conflicting standards. California hasjoined with six other Western states and the Canadian province of British Columbia in the Western Regional Climate Action
Initiative to collaboratively fight global warming. 25 1 There are seven
Northeastern and MidAtlantic states working together in the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative to cap GHG emissions. 252 If, despite these
regional efforts, conflicting standards were to arise and become too
problematic, the federal government could always act and set a national standard preempting all state standards.
Finally, under the fourth principle laid out in Healy, the EPS is
not extraterritorial because California is not requiring out-of-state
merchants to seek regulatory approval in California before they sell
electricity to utilities in other states.
CEED argued that the EPS is extraterritorial legislation because it
"cannot avoid having the practical and actual effect of regulating
GHG emissions of out-of-state generators selling into the California
market, thus unlawfully controlling commercial conduct beyond the
borders of California." 253 As evidence of the EPS's impermissible extraterritorial effect, CEED cited a newspaper article reporting that
Sempra Energy had halted or downsized the development of its Granite Fox power plant in Nevada because of California's new
254
regulations.
CEED has misapplied the test. CEED appears to believe that if a
law has any kind of economic extraterritorial effect, then it is uncon251. See Western Regional Climate Action Initiative, http://www.utah.gov/governor/
docs/WesternRegionalClimateActionInitiative.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2007).
252. See Reg'I Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 93.
253. CEED Opening Brief, supra note 105, at 9.
254. Id. at 8 (citing Susan Voyles, Sempra Energy Halts Gerlach Project Study, RENo GAZETTE J., Mar. 8, 2006, http://www.nevadacleanenergy.com/20060308RenoGazette.html).
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stitutional. However, there is a distinction between a law that impacts
conduct in another state and a law which directly controls conduct
outside a state's boundaries.
Kirsten Engel correctly argued that when reviewing state environmental regulations, courts should interpret the extraterritorial test in
a way that encourages states to consider not only the economic impacts of their acts but also the extraterritorial environmental impacts. 25 5 "[An important goal of environmental policy (and,
obviously, economic efficiency) is to encourage economic actors to
'256
In
account for the full environmental costs of their actions.
addition:
[S]tate concern for such effects would seem to promote the core
federalism value of interstate harmony. Concern for the impact of
one's actions upon others is a fundamental tenet of good-neighborliness, both among persons and states.
Indeed, where a state's activities harm the environment, failure to accord weight to extraterritorial effects can have disastrous
effects upon interstate relations. This is aptly demonstrated by the
current acrimony between Northeastern and Midwestern states
2 57
over the pollution-generating utilities located in the Midwest.
California's electricity purchases have caused extraterritorial environmental consequences that California is now attempting to control
through its EPS. The legislature's action, however, does not constitute
"extraterritorial" regulation under the dormant Commerce Clause.
Rather, the Act is an example of one state trying to be a good neighbor and a concerned global citizen.
IV.

Conclusion

California has taken an important step forward in the battle
against global warming by enacting the landmark Act. The State has
continued its tradition of leading the nation in environmental protection by enacting a law that is tough on GHG emissions but respectful
of the United States Constitution. CPUC and CEC carefully considered the legal consequences of the EPS they were called upon to create. The result is a EPS that does not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause of the Constitution. The EPS does not discriminate against outof-state power plants on its face or by purpose or effect. The legitimate
local interests and benefits of the law outweigh the minimal burden
255. Kirsten Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental
Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 Ecology L.Q. 243, 343-44 (1999).
256. Id. at 343-44.
257. Id. at 345-46.
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on interstate commerce. The law is not extraterritorial because it does
not directly control commerce which occurs wholly outside the
boundaries of the State.
It remains to be seen whether this law, on its own, can stop the
rush to build conventional coal-fired power plants in the Western Region. It may be enough, however, to send a jolt through the industry
and make it realize it can no longer live in the past. The time has
arrived to invest in the future and the development of clean-energy
25 8
technology. California's new law will help guide the way.

258. On May 3, 2007, Washington Governor Christine Gregoire signed a bill similar to
SB 1368 that will go into effect in July 2008. Washington Senate Bill 6001 prohibits utilities
from entering into long-term contracts with electric-generating units unless they meet a
GHG EPS of 1,100 pounds per megawatt hour. S.B. 6001, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2007), available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2007-08/Pdf/Bills/Session%20
Law%202007/6001-S.SL.pdf.
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